

Individual Determinants of Foreign Aid Support: Do Individuals Think Like States?*

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Abstract

Do the determinants of individual support for foreign aid mirror the apparent motives behind state giving? Current theories on why states give foreign aid focus on state-level factors highlighting three main motivations: altruistic, strategic, and economic. This work examines whether these factors also predict individual attitudes about foreign aid in donor countries. To investigate this question, I use data from the second wave of the *World Values Survey* to perform a cross-national analysis of public opinion in donor countries. I explore the strategic hypothesis more rigorously by using data from the CCES survey administered in the United States around the November 2010 election. Questions about domestic welfare preference, class membership and education, and strategic concerns are assessed as predictors of support for foreign aid and tests of the state-level factors at the individual level. My results confirm that altruistic variables are universally good predictors of support for foreign aid, along with variables such as political interest and trust in government. Findings on the strategic and economic hypotheses are more mixed. While the economic hypothesis is confirmed cross-nationally, economic self-interest seems to play no role in determining attitudes in the American sample. Conversely, the strategic hypothesis is rejected cross-nationally, but it finds support among American respondents. These results raise a puzzle for future research about the apparent disconnect between strategic and economic state-level motivations for foreign aid and the more altruistic determinants of individual support.

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1 Introduction

The vast literature on foreign aid addresses two main questions: why states give foreign aid and the effectiveness of it. Comparatively little, however, has been written on individual preferences for and beliefs about foreign aid. The individual level is particularly relevant to the foreign aid literature. The large majority of donor countries are democracies where public opinion is more likely to affect government decision-making. Furthermore, though scholars have investigated international and domestic institutional influences on foreign aid giving, little has been done to connect these influences to domestic public opinion. Thus, this paper assesses the individual determinants of support for foreign aid in donor countries using state-level determinants as a theoretical guide. Theories on why states give foreign aid focus on three key factors: strategic, altruistic, and economic motivations. My research addresses whether these state-level motivations influence individual support for foreign aid.

Why should scholars care about individual preferences for foreign aid? For a large number of developing countries, foreign aid makes up a substantial part of national income. The effect of this large influx of cash on economic and political development in recipient countries is debated (see Easterly (2001, 2006) and Sachs (2004, 2005) for two sides of the debate). Whether foreign aid should continue to be a foreign policy option that donor states employ has received substantial attention in academe and the press. Those scholars who argue that aid is ineffective suggest at the extreme that foreign aid should be discontinued as it contributes to sustained and corrupt autocratic rule through a mechanism similar to that of the resource curse (Moyo 2009). Because the effects of foreign aid are debatable and even detrimental to a recipient country's political development and economic growth potential, it is important to understand why states give foreign aid. Specifically, identifying the determinants of public support for foreign aid in donor countries may provide insight into this decision.

There does appear to be a positive relationship between state giving and individual preferences. The basic relationship is easily seen in the below scatterplot. In Figure 1, the percentage of a country's Gross National Income (GNI) in 1995 allocated for Official Development Assistance (ODA)

1995 Individual Preferences for Foreign Aid vs. Amounts Given




Figure 1: Preferences and ODA Levels

is plotted against the percentage of individuals responding “very much for” to a question on the 1995 *World Values Survey* asking whether respondents were for or against their country providing economic aid to developing countries. The obvious positive correlation between the two suggests that understanding variation in foreign aid giving by states requires a better understanding of the sources of individual preferences within states.

This paper proceeds in five sections. First, I begin by reviewing the relevant foreign aid literature. Second, I outline the variables used and hypotheses tested in a cross-national analysis of individual preferences for foreign aid. Third, I highlight my main results and the implications of these results. Briefly, I find that altruistic and economic self-interest motivations positively predict support for economic aid, while national security concerns are negatively related to support for it.

Fourth, I present results and discussion from a recent study of American public opinion. Motivated by the puzzling cross-national finding, I use data collected around the November 2010 election in the United States to further investigate the relationship between security and foreign aid preferences. I highlight two results that help to clarify the negative relationship between strategic values and economic aid. While the security proxy is unrelated to preferences for *economic* aid in the American sample, I find that it is positively correlated with preferences for *military* aid. Moreover, I test the conditional hypothesis that strategic values will be positively correlated with economic aid only if individuals do not perceive a budgetary tradeoff between economic aid and spending on national defense. I find evidence in support of this hypothesis. Finally, I conclude and detail a plan for future research on this topic.

2 Determinants of Foreign Aid Giving

2.1 Reasons Why States Give

Scholars have converged on three main motivations behind state foreign aid giving: strategic, altruistic, and economic. One argument suggests that states give aid not to the neediest countries, but on the basis of their strategic interests (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McKinlay and Little 1977). Alesina and Dollar's (2000) research on patterns of foreign aid giving is one of the most prominent articulations of the strategic motivation. They look at bilateral aid from various donors and find evidence that political and strategic concerns influence aid giving as much or more than a recipient country's need for and effective use of aid does. Specifically, they show that colonial ties and political alliances are good predictors of the direction of foreign aid. This confirms a finding by Maizels and Nissanke (1984) who show that bilateral aid from donor countries is allocated based on perceived political and security interests. Whereas Alesina and Dollar do not include multilateral aid in their study, Maizels and Nissanke look at patterns of multilateral aid donations as well. They find that in contrast to bilateral aid, aid from multilateral organizations generally targets those countries with need for it without discernable political or security objectives. Thus, they argue that the strategic nature

of aid is largely confined to aid directed by national governments to other national governments, while aid directed through international or regional organizations is more need-based.¹

The strategic argument is offset by another set of motivations offered by the literature. These motivations are altruistic in nature (Lumsdaine 1993; Noel and Therien 1995). Lumsdaine (1993) argues that political and security interests alone cannot explain foreign aid giving. He states, "...the essential causes [lie] in the humanitarian and egalitarian principles of the donor countries" (30). He argues that aid has become increasingly multilateral, which as illustrated above, has been shown to be relatively apolitical compared to bilateral aid. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the donor community increasingly gives concessional aid as opposed to aid tied to purchases in the donor country. Noel and Therien (1995) and Lumsdaine both find a strong correlation between a state's level of domestic welfare and its level of foreign aid expenditures. Specifically, Lumsdaine states that countries that give the most are those "with strong domestic social welfare programs and those with strong private contributions to private voluntary organizations" (41). Indeed, Lumsdaine even finds a correlation between individual support for foreign aid and variables indicating a "moral vision" or humanitarian ethic (154). Thus, while he does acknowledge that states might give for strategic reasons, he shows that a large percentage of total foreign aid in the international system is increasingly altruistic in nature.

A third argument made by scholars is that states give aid for purely economic reasons based on the distributional consequences of international economic policy. Specifically, some scholars contend that trade and foreign aid should have the same base of support from domestic constituencies based on perceived economic benefits (Milner and Tingley 2008, 2010a, 2011). These explanations build on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which says that the winners (and losers) from open trade policy will vary by factors of production. In the trade argument, owners of factors in relative abundance will favor open trade policy because they have a comparative advantage in the international market. For example, in the United States, capitalists should favor open trade policy, while unskilled laborers should be against policies that open the economy up to competition from cheap foreign labor.

¹Though recent work has also shown multilateral aid to have a strategic element to it (see for example Kuziemko and Werker 2006).

Milner and Tingley (2010a) use this theorem to explain foreign aid preferences, arguing that owners of relatively abundant factors *also* benefit from foreign aid due to the increased ability of individuals in foreign markets to buy their goods. They use votes from legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives on foreign aid amendments as an indicator of domestic preferences. They find that legislators from districts with a larger proportion of high-skilled workers tend to vote in favor of foreign aid amendments more than legislators from other districts. This finding mirrors similar results from the trade policy literature.²

Finally, all three motivations may explain aid allocation at different points in time within and across countries. Scholars in particular suggest that the foreign aid policies of certain countries can be seen as representative of the three different motivations (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; McKinlay and Little 1977; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). Schraeder, *et al.* (1998) show that the United States and France allocate aid strategically on the basis of security concerns or colonial ties. The foreign aid program of Japan, on the other hand, is argued to be primarily determined by commercial interests. Finally, Sweden is the example used for the altruistic motivation. They show that Swedish aid allocations are driven in part by recipient need, but also out of economic interest.

2.2 Individual Preferences for Foreign Aid

While the international trade literature has seen a recent increase in the use of individual-level survey data, the foreign aid literature has only minimal research of this type (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Baker 2005, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Mansfield and Mutz 2009 for examples of public opinion work on trade preferences). The literature on individual support for foreign aid is small, but it can be split into two camps: American preferences on foreign aid and international preferences on foreign aid. In the work on American public opinion on foreign aid, scholars investigate the general determinants of individual support, as well as attitudes toward specific types of foreign aid. Researchers at the Program on International Policy Attitudes, for example, have conducted a series of surveys in the United States on various foreign policy issues (PIPA 2001). They show

²Hiscox (2002) finds some support for this result. However, he also finds that this vote varies over time as factors become more and less specific.

variation in the type of foreign aid individuals support as well as the amount of aid respondents prefer. Americans also tend to overestimate the amount of foreign aid given by the United States government and have strong feelings about the way aid is used in foreign countries; results that scholars suspect impact the amount and type of aid Americans prefer (PIPA 2001, 30-31). While these facts are useful in understanding American attitudes, the authors simply report descriptive statistics about the data gathered and only make conjectures about the correlations.

Tingley (2009) more directly tests a theory of individual preferences in the United States. The author finds support for the economic self-interest story by priming respondents with information about the effect of foreign aid on American exports. He shows that when individuals in a treatment group are told that foreign aid increases exports they indicate support more often than individuals in a control group not subject to the priming. He acknowledges, however, that his article is rather narrow in scope and does not explain all of the possible factors that could influence opinions on foreign aid. Moreover, the study does not speak to the relative importance of other motivations such as security interests.

Finally, Milner and Tingley (2010b) and Milner (2006) focus on preferences for different types of aid: multilateral and bilateral. Milner shows that drops in public support for foreign aid are correlated with increased allocations of aid to multilateral institutions. This finding supports her theory that states use multilateral institutions to signal their good foreign aid intentions when publics are wary about the country's foreign aid policy. Both Milner's 2006 chapter and her work with Tingley (2010b) suggest the principal-agent framework is a useful prism through which to view the public's support of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. They use public opinion data to sort through various other ways of viewing this choice. Their data show that individuals support bilateral aid because states have more control over it and support multilateral aid out of burden-sharing concerns. Both findings support predictions based on the principal-agent framework.

These studies, while groundbreaking, provide a less than complete picture of individual preferences on foreign aid in the United States. Furthermore, to the extent that they contribute to our knowledge of foreign aid preferences, the results are limited to the United States. While nominally

the United States gives the highest amount of foreign aid, as a percentage of GDP, it is behind most other donors. Moreover, the American public is notoriously opposed to foreign aid, while the publics in other donor states are much more in favor of it. Thus, the determinants of American preferences may not be generalizable to the rest of the donor community.

More broadly, a limited number of studies specify political economy models of individual preferences for foreign aid and a few evaluate cross-national opinions. For example, Mayer and Raimondos-Moller (2003) develop a general political economy model of median voter preferences over foreign aid policies, predicting that both altruistic and economic self-interest motivations should affect attitudes. Specifically, they show that it is possible for some individuals to benefit so greatly from the redistributive effects of foreign aid that they support it above levels that their own altruism would predict. Other scholars have used survey data from a handful of international surveys to investigate general predictors of foreign aid support cross-nationally. Some key determinants to emerge are religiosity, income, concern about world poverty and international affairs, and trust in other people and one's own government (Paxton and Knack 2008, Chong and Gradstein 2008). Finally, Milner and Tingley (2008) use international survey data to examine three foreign policy issues - foreign aid, trade, and immigration - in order to explain attitudes on general international economic engagement. They find that economic explanations derived from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem are the best predictors of individual attitudes on foreign economic policy, though again, they do not test other motivations such as security or altruistic factors.

The key contribution I make to the above literature, and specifically the literature on individual preferences for foreign aid, is to investigate how state-level determinants of foreign aid relate to individual preferences. More concretely, do individuals support foreign aid for strategic, altruistic, or economic self-interest reasons? The weakness of the above literature is that it is either specific to the United States or too general and not theoretically grounded. Furthermore, it does not attempt to relate back to the literature on why states give aid. This is important because while some variations of the economic and altruistic motivations have been tested at the individual level, no study has attempted to explain whether individuals support aid for strategic reasons even though

this motivation at the state level is clearly present.³ The following section outlines the hypotheses derived from the above literature and the operationalization of the variables used in my analysis.

3 Hypotheses and Operationalization

Three main observable implications follow from the literature on state-level determinants of foreign aid. First, if individuals believe that aid is allocated based on the security interests of the donor, then individuals who see national security as a priority should be more in favor of foreign aid. Second, Lumsdaine (1993) argues that donors externalize norms of domestic generosity (as measured by large domestic welfare programs or high levels of charitable contributions, for example) in their foreign aid policy. Thus, at the individual level, those persons supporting domestic welfare or participating in charitable organizations would favor foreign aid more. Finally, if owners of relatively abundant factors in donor countries believe that foreign aid increases the demand foreign individuals or states have for capital and goods, then they will support foreign aid. I investigate these (and other) hypotheses using both cross-national and American survey data. The empirical section of the paper starts below with the cross-national study and then proceeds to the U.S. specific analysis.

The data I use in the cross-national study comes from the second wave of the *World Values Survey* (WVS).⁴ I rely on a sample of nine countries, in which respondents were asked the key questions that become my dependent and independent variables in the analysis. The countries are Australia, Germany, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United States. These countries all vary substantially in the amount of aid they give and respondents display significant variation in their answers to the key questions used in my analysis as shown below in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

³There is one other project similar to my own. This study uses the state-level determinants to investigate British attitudes on world poverty. The researchers find that altruism is a positive predictor of concern for the poor in other countries, while self-interest explanations, both economic and security, are negatively related to concern for poverty (Van Heerde and Hudson 2010). While their research sheds light on what I may expect from these variables in my analysis, it does not directly test attitudes on foreign aid the way that my study does.

⁴Conducted in countries from 1994-1999.

3.1 Dependent Variable




Figure 2: Dependent Variable Distribution

This project seeks to explain variation in individual preferences for foreign aid. To this end, I use a question from the WVS that asks about economic aid preferences. It states, “Some people favor, and others are against, having this country provide economic aid to poorer countries. Are you personally 1-Very much against 2-Somewhat against 3-For to some extent 4-Very much for?”⁵ The distribution of this variable for the countries in the sample is shown above. Given that in Figure 2 the most common response by far in all countries was “for to some extent”, I view the response of “very much for” as identifying those who truly support economic aid. A response of “for to some

⁵I highlight in my discussion and American preferences analysis the implications for assessing only economic aid preferences in the cross-national study.

extent” may simply indicate ambivalence, since there is no neutral category, or weak support for reasons of social desirability. I view explaining the variation in responses of “very much for” as a more useful test for the theories of interest than an ordinal or otherwise dichotomized variable.⁶ Therefore, the dependent variable used is a binary indicator: 1 if respondent is “very much for”, 0 otherwise.

3.2 Explanatory Variables

All other variables used in the cross-national analysis also come from the WVS. My analysis employs three categories of key explanatory variables: altruistic factors, economic endowment, and strategic factors. To assess the altruistic motivation, I use a question that captures an individual’s level of participation in charitable organizations. *Charity*, ranges from 1-3 with 1 indicating no participation, 2 indicating inactive membership, and 3 indicating active membership. As a robustness check, I use a question asking individuals their preference for domestic welfare. The question asks, “Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount, too much, or too little?”. This variable appears in my tables and the rest of this discussion as *Welfare* and ranges from 1-3, with 1 corresponding to “too much” and 3 with “too little”. I derive the following hypothesis, H1, from the above literature on the altruistic motivation for state foreign aid giving.

H1: *The more active an individual is in charitable organizations or the more strongly she favors domestic welfare, the more likely it is that she will support foreign economic aid.*

To test the economic self-interest motivation, I use a question that asks individuals to identify their placement on a class scale. This is the variable used in Milner and Tingley’s (2008) cross-national analysis. They find *Class* to be the strongest predictor of support for international economic engagement across industrialized countries. *Class* ranges from 1-5 with 1 representing lower class and 5 representing upper class. I check for robustness of the economic hypothesis using *Education*

⁶Results do not vary substantially if the dependent variable is dichotomized at “somewhat for”. Similarly, ordered logit models reveal that findings are constant when the dependent variable is left as a four-category variable.

as an alternative variable.⁷ *Education* is not my main indicator of economic endowment for two reasons. First, interpretation of education levels can vary widely across countries as all have different systems of education.⁸ Second, Japan was not asked the education question and would therefore drop out of my sample. It is particularly important to have a measure of economic endowment for Japan, and to have Japan in the sample more generally, as it is the country that the foreign aid literature points to as giving aid out of commercial interests. I adopt the below hypothesis, H2, to test the economic self-interest motivation. I concur with Milner and Tingley's (2008) suggestion that the higher one's class the more likely the respondent is to be an owner of a country's abundant factor in industrialized countries. If the economic self-interest motivation is at work, then higher-class individuals should support foreign aid on the assumption that they will reap the benefits from foreign buyers.

H2: *The higher one's class or level of education, the more one should support economic aid.*

Lastly, I operationalize the strategic motivation using a question asking individuals to identify what they think their nation's priority should be over the next ten years. Respondents are given a choice among four alternatives, one of which is "a strong national defense force". Individuals are asked to select their first and second choice for their nation's priority. The variable I create, *Natl Security*, ranges from 1-3 with 1 corresponding to individuals who did not select national defense, 2 for individuals selecting it as their second choice, and 3 for individuals selecting it as the top priority. With this variable, I can identify those individuals who believe national defense to be the highest priority over alternatives such as economic growth. It is with this variable that I test the most unique of my hypotheses drawn from the state-level determinants. If individuals believe that foreign aid serves a strategic purpose and they think national security is a priority, then they should

⁷In the countries where respondents were asked about education level, the WVS presents a scale that ranges from 1-No Formal Education to 9-University-level Education, with diploma. I collapse Education into four categories: 1-Incomplete Secondary and below 2-Complete Secondary 3-Some University 4-Complete University.

⁸The interpretation of education is further complicated by findings in the trade literature. For example, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find support for the hypothesis that higher-skilled workers support open trade policy using education level as a measure of skill. However, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) find support for the idea that education not only captures skill, but also exposure to economic ideas and information key to shaping attitudes on trade and globalization. Similarly, Mansfield and Mutz (2009) argue that education can be a measure of out-group anxiety, which would also influence an individual's support for trade. Thus, while I will interpret education as an indicator of factor endowment, it is important to keep in mind that there are multiple ways in which education could influence foreign aid preferences.

be in favor of economic aid. This hypothesis is stated below as H3.

H3: *The more an individual prioritizes national security, the more she should be in favor of economic aid.*

3.3 Control and Demographic Variables

While I am most interested in the effect of the above variables on foreign aid preferences, a number of other correlates appear in the literature and are included in some models as controls. Scholars find liberal ideology to be a good predictor of support for foreign aid (Milner and Tingley 2008, 2010b; Paxton and Knack 2008; Tingley 2009). The WVS includes a question asking individuals to place themselves on a left-right ideological scale, 1-10. However, because political ideology can have different interpretations across countries, I also perform a robustness check in some models using variables based on a principal components analysis of questions that capture the economic ideology dimension and the social ideology dimension of the left-right scale.⁹ I expect a negative relationship between these three variables and my dependent variable: the more liberal one is, the more supportive of economic aid one should be. These variables appear in tables and discussion as *Econ-ideology*, *Soc-ideology*, and *Ideology*.

Nationalism, trust in government (*GovTrust*), and political interest (*PolInterest*) have also been used by scholars to predict foreign aid preferences (Chong and Gradstein 2008, Milner and Tingley 2008, Paxton and Knack 2008). Higher levels of nationalism might indicate an individual unwelcoming to outsiders, suggesting a negative relationship with foreign aid. In some countries, however, where foreign aid is closely identified with the nation's reputation or identity, nationalism might have a positive correlation. Perhaps for this reason, Milner and Tingley (2008) find little support for their nationalism variable as a predictor of foreign aid preference. Thus, I predict nationalism to have no effect in the pooled analysis and varying effects in the country-sample regressions. Because of nationalism's potentially mixed meaning in different countries, I alternate it with a variable called *NeighImm*. This is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if an individual selected

⁹The questions and scores used to construct these variables are available in Appendix A.

“immigrant/foreign worker” as a person they would not like to have as a neighbor. This variable may better capture the influence of xenophobia than does the nationalism variable, and it also avoids the issues associated with different interpretations of nationalism across countries.¹⁰ I expect that individuals who would not like to live next to immigrants or foreign workers will be less supportive of foreign aid.

Chong and Gradstein (2008) find that trust in government is a positive predictor of foreign aid support. Their explanation for the relationship between foreign aid preference and trust in government is that opinion on foreign aid may be driven by how effective individuals believe their government is at allocating it. They find this variable to be positively and significantly correlated with economic aid preference across models. This relationship is also supported by Milner’s (2006) assessment of multilateral and bilateral aid preferences, where she finds that governments allocate aid multilaterally when public opinion on aid is down to signal their good intentions. Both studies suggest the hypothesis that individuals with more trust in their government will favor foreign aid more.

Tingley (2009) finds internationalist values and interest to predict foreign aid support. Similarly, Paxton and Knack (2008) use a series of variables to account for an individual’s “attention to international affairs”. The variable that they find has the largest effect on foreign aid preferences is political interest. Political interest might affect aid preference through various mechanisms. Knowledge about the actual amount of aid given might be greater among individuals with a strong interest in political affairs. This may be important, as amounts of foreign aid are usually overestimated, particularly in the United States, which scholars suggest might impact public opinion (PIPA 2001). Furthermore, individuals with higher levels of political interest might have a greater awareness about inequalities in the international system, which could lead them to support foreign aid. These all imply that more politically interested individuals should be more supportive of foreign aid.

Finally, I control for demographic variables that might impact foreign aid preferences, in particular, the variables *Age*, *Female*, and *Child*. One can imagine that as people grow older or have

¹⁰Unfortunately, this question was not asked in Finland and Japan, otherwise I would have used it instead of *Nationalism* in my baseline model.

children they become more fiscally conservative or desire more services from the government. Thus, they might prefer their government to spend money domestically rather than internationally. This suggests that older individuals and individuals with children will be less supportive of foreign aid. Additionally, a robust finding in the international trade literature shows that women are less internationalist and more protectionist (see for example Burgoon and Hiscox 2003). Thus, I hypothesize that women will be less supportive of foreign aid.

4 Cross-National Results

Table 2 holds coefficient estimates from pooled logit models of foreign economic aid preferences. To control for heterogeneity across countries, I include binary indicators for each country in all but one model. Because coefficients from logit models can be difficult to interpret, I present several figures showing substantive effects of important variables for the median country in my sample.¹¹ The predicted probabilities are based on Model 2 setting *Female* and *Child* at their median (0 and 1 respectively) and all other covariates at their mean. Table 3 presents results from running Model 2 on each individual country sample. I display the substantive effects of all the variables from the within country regressions in Figures 6, 7, and 8. A discussion of my results and relationship to the theory follows.

[Table 2 about here]

4.1 Explanatory Variables

Based on the altruistic motivation for state foreign aid provision, I predicted a positive correlation between participation in charity organizations and foreign economic aid. This relationship is confirmed across all models, except the one without country fixed effects. The coefficient is positive and significant at the .001 level in these specifications and does not vary substantially in magnitude. Using the baseline model, Model 2, *Charity* has a strong substantive effect on the probability of

¹¹The median country was chosen based on the median level of foreign aid support across countries. In this analysis, the country used is Australia.

supporting foreign economic aid. Moving the variable from its minimum (1) to its maximum (3), while holding *Female* and *Child* at their median and all other variables at their mean, elicits a statistically significant change of .08 in the predicted probability of supporting foreign economic aid (from .15 to .23). This change is graphically represented in Figure 3. I check the robustness of the altruistic motivation by substituting the variable *Welfare* in the baseline model in Model 5. *Welfare* is also positive and significant in its model, and produces a similar change in predicted probability when moved from its minimum (1) to its maximum (3): .07, from .13 to .20. These results support findings by Paxton and Knack (2008) and models such as the one developed by Mayer and Raimondos-Moller (2003). Furthermore, this test of the altruistic motivation gives support to Lumsdaine’s (1993) idea that, like states, individuals externalize norms of domestic generosity in the form of support for foreign economic aid.




Figure 3: Predicted Probability from Pooled Analysis

The economic self-interest motivation also holds up well. In all models, *Class* is positive and significant at the .05 level. *Education* is also positive and significant in the model in which it appears. These findings replicate similar ones already in the literature. Milner and Tingley (2008,

2010a) find that the economic self-interest story is the most successful at predicting general foreign policy attitudes and the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on foreign aid amendments. Nearly all of the articles on foreign aid preferences include one of these measures, and my results confirm their findings even when controlling for different covariates. Figure 4 shows the change in predicted probability of the dependent variable in Model 2 when taking *Class* across its range, 1-5. It produces a positive and significant change of .11 (.12 at the *Class* minimum to .23 at the *Class* maximum).




Figure 4: Predicted Probability from Pooled Analysis

Where individual determinants appear to deviate from state-level determinants is with regard to the strategic hypothesis. The hypothesis states that *Natl Security* should be positively related to economic aid preference if individuals believe aid serves a strategic purpose and thereby improves national security. The results resoundingly show the opposite. Across all models, *Natl Security* is negatively related to foreign aid preference and is significant at the .001 level. I use Model 2 again to assess the substantive effects of *Natl Security* and show the change graphically in Figure 5. Moving across its range (1-3), the variable produces a .08 decrease in the probability of supporting economic aid, reducing the likelihood of support from .18 to .10. This change is also significant

at conventional levels. This suggests that even though aid can be explicitly given for strategic purposes, individuals still may not see it as serving a security role.




Figure 5: Predicted Probability from Pooled Analysis

There are several possible explanations for this result. One is that only politically sophisticated individuals understand that foreign aid, and economic aid in particular, can be given for strategic reasons. To test this conditional hypothesis, I interact *Natl Security* with *PolInterest* and insert the interaction term into Model 2. The coefficient on the interaction term is small and positive, but has a large standard error. Thus, I cannot conclude that political interest has a significant impact. A second possibility is that individuals who place a high priority on national security need to trust that their government can allocate aid effectively before supporting it as a strategic tool. To test this theory, I try a second interaction between *Natl Security* and *GovTrust* in Model 2. Again, the coefficient on the interaction term is small and positive, but not significant. Thus, having found only results counter to the strategic hypothesis, I test a number of other theories using new survey data from the United States, which I discuss in the following section.

4.2 Control and Demographic Variables

Most of the other covariates performed as predicted. *Ideology* is negative and significant in all models as are *Econ-Ideology* and *Soc-ideology* in the model in which they appear. *PolInterest* and *GovTrust* are significant and in the predicted direction across model specifications. *Age* is also significant and in the expected direction for most models. *Female* and *Child* are never significant in any model, though the sign on *Female* is positive in all models, which was not predicted. These sets of variables show that demographic factors may not be good predictors of individual support for foreign aid. Political variables that capture domestic policy preferences, political knowledge, and trust in government seem to explain more of the variation. Finally, my measure of nationalism is never significant in any model but is nevertheless in the expected direction. Because of nationalism’s potentially mixed meaning in different countries, I insert *NeighImm* in Model 7. The sign is in the predicted direction for *NeighImm* and highly significant at the .001 level. Thus, I confirm Milner and Tingley’s (2008) mixed results regarding nationalism, but when I use a measure that more closely proxies for xenophobia, the result is significant and supports the hypothesis.

4.3 Results by Country

The coefficients on the binary country indicators used in the pooled analysis reveal that nationality does matter. In all models with fixed effects, the country variable dropped is the binary indicator for Sweden. Sweden has the second highest percentage of individuals responding that they are “very much for” foreign aid and the highest amount donated as a percentage of its GNI. The coefficients on the country indicators are nearly all negative and significant. The one exception is Spain, which had the highest percentage of respondents supporting aid. Thus, one would expect these results as, relative to Sweden, an individual from most other countries in the sample supports aid less. While the pooled results give insight into general trends in economic aid support, I also use within country regressions to check the results and explore any variation in covariate effects.

[Table 3 about here]

For the within country regressions, I used the variables from Model 2 of the pooled analysis. Table 3 holds the coefficient estimates for each country sample. While the coefficients vary substantially in magnitude, there are no significant changes in sign across countries with the exception of the variable for gender, *Female*.¹² The model seems to fit the United States sample the best based on the pseudo-R2, while fitting Japan and Spain the least well. In fact, no variables attain significance at the .05 level in the regression on the Japanese sample and only *Ideology* is significant in the Spanish regression. Figures 6, 7, and 8 graphically display the substantive effects for each variable in each within country regression. These effects are the difference in predicted probability of supporting foreign aid when moving each variable from its minimum to its maximum. For each predicted probability, all other variables are set to their mean except for *Child* and *Female* which are again set at their median.




Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities from Within Country Analysis

¹²In the USA regression, Female has a highly significant negative relationship with foreign aid support, while in the Finland regression it has a significant and positive coefficient. The literature on American public opinion predicts this relationship between gender and international economic engagement, but I am unaware of any research that would predict the positive relationship in Finland.

Figure 6 holds the effects for all three key independent variables. The altruistic and economic endowment variables perform as predicted in most countries though their effects vary in significance. For example, moving *Charity* from its minimum to its maximum increases the probability in every country that an individual supports foreign economic aid. Similarly, the effects of *Class* are positive in all countries, but strongest in the Nordic countries. Swedish opinion is also greatly affected by defense priority. There, a move from the minimum to the maximum of *Natl Security* elicits a -.25 change in predicted probability. Moreover, significant changes are also observed in the United States (-.08) and Australian (-.12) samples. While significant, these changes once again go against the predicted relationship for *Natl Security* and foreign aid. In fact, only New Zealand and Japan experience a small and positive, though insignificant, increase in the predicted probability of supporting foreign aid. Overall, the effects of these variables are not always consistent in strength across countries, but they are overwhelmingly consistent in sign, lending some support to the results presented from the pooled analysis.




Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities from Within Country Analysis

Of the control variables, one can see in Figure 7 that trust in government produces the largest




Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities from Within Country Analysis

effect of any variable when moved from its minimum to its maximum. New Zealand and Sweden both see an increase in predicted probability of around .35. *Ideology* and *Nationalism* both have the predicted relationship in most countries, although there are a few countries, namely Spain and Finland, in which moving *Nationalism* across its range elicits a positive increase in predicted probability. This again lends some support to the idea that pride in one's country may be positively correlated with foreign economic aid if foreign aid is wrapped up in the nation's identity. This argument makes some sense with Finland, but less sense with Spain. Of all the variables, *PolInterest* has the most consistent effect and its effect is significant in more countries than any other variable.

Based on the results from these controls, and the less impressive results on the demographic variables in Figure 8, the within country regressions again confirm that political and policy variables are stronger predictors of an individual's support for foreign aid than demographic variables. *Class* is the one exception, confirming perhaps that individual's perceive commercial gains from foreign aid and that this perception drives support up among the owners of the relatively abundant factors

in donor countries.

4.4 Discussion

So do the same factors that are thought to influence state giving also influence individual attitudes toward foreign aid? The results are mixed. Individuals do appear to externalize their personal levels of altruism by supporting aid to foreign countries. Indeed, the results from the pooled and within country regressions support this claim. While this might seem trivially true, one could have told an alternative story that would have predicted a negative relationship between participation in charity organizations or support for domestic welfare and support for foreign aid. In this scenario, an individual supports domestic charitable works and poverty relief and sees foreign aid as detracting from the government's ability to provide for the domestic poor. The opportunity cost story does not seem probable based on the positive relationship discovered between *Charity* and *Welfare*, and support for foreign economic aid. Instead, this result suggests that Lumsdaine's (1993) theory of the externalization of a moral vision is at work at the individual level.

The economic self-interest theory for state-level giving is also supported at the individual level. Similar to the charity and domestic welfare variables, my analysis could have discovered a negative relationship between the economic endowment variables and foreign economic aid. Because individuals at the upper end of the class spectrum also pay a greater share of taxes in most countries, one could have expected they would be less enthusiastic about their money being given away to foreign countries in the form of aid. It is even possible that this is still happening and that my results are actually driven by the opposition of the lower class to foreign aid, rather than the upper class's support. In this case, those that benefit from domestic government programs would be against foreign aid as it takes away from services from which they benefit. The robustness check for domestic welfare preference, however, gives me some confidence that this relationship is not driving the result.

The biggest challenge to the economic self-interest results arises from uncertainty over what the proxies for factor ownership are really capturing. An individual making the connection between

foreign aid and the potential for increased exports is somewhat unlikely. Indeed, Tingley (2009) claims support for the economic self-interest story, though the prime he uses in his survey gives individuals the information about increased exports. Another story consistent with some of the trade literature is also plausible (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006). Higher-class individuals could have access to more information and may have higher levels of education than their peers. They also may be less xenophobic through increased exposure to outsiders and ideas (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).¹³ On the other hand, Milner and Tingley (2008) argue that economic education effects are a larger threat to inferences in the trade literature than in the foreign aid literature, as economics courses do not typically discuss the effects of foreign aid. To the extent that they do, the effects of foreign aid in recipient countries are hotly debated and it is unclear how individuals would form decisive opinions on foreign economic aid through college education. I take both points seriously and simply argue for more research on the relationship between variables such as education that are meant to capture economic endowment and foreign aid preferences.

The strategic variable is the least successful of the state-level determinants at predicting individual support for foreign aid in the hypothesized direction. *Natl Security* is never significant in the predicted direction and interactions with other potentially influential variables were unsuccessful. I suggest two reasons for this result. First, although the opportunity cost story did not seem to describe the link between foreign aid preferences and domestic altruism, it may better fit the relationship between security and aid. If individuals want a strong national defense, they may see spending money on foreign aid as taking away from domestic security spending. This would be true if individuals do not believe foreign aid serves a strategic purpose. Thus, one might conclude from this analysis that individuals do not see foreign aid as security enhancing.

However, there may be a second reason for this result that impacts the interpretation. The question taken for the dependent variable uses the phrase “economic aid to developing countries”. While it is true that economic aid can be and is distributed strategically, individuals may be less likely to see economic aid as having a strategic purpose than military aid. In some ways, this

¹³Though, controlling for political interest and xenophobia gives me more confidence that this is not what is going on.

presented the hardest test for the strategic hypothesis. If I had discovered a relationship in the hypothesized direction, I would have been confident of finding the same relationship for military aid.¹⁴ Therefore, I can say that these results suggest that individuals do not think of economic aid as being strategic, but this may not be true of other types of aid. Furthermore, to the extent that I find confirmatory relationships in the cross-national analysis between my other independent variables and my dependent variable, one must consider how the relationships might change using preferences on military aid as the dependent variable.¹⁵

I investigate the two above hypotheses about the negative relationship between aid and security using data from the United States gathered in October-November 2010. I also seek to confirm the external validity of my results from the cross-national study using different survey data. The next section outlines this data and presents the results from the study. The final section includes a brief discussion of this new data and offers conclusions based on the findings from both sets of analyses.

5 US Public Opinion

I use a second source of survey data to explore American public opinion on foreign aid. This data is from a survey instrument administered by the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to a random sample of approximately 1000 Americans around the November 2010 election. The survey includes questions of my own design, which ask respondents about their opinions on government spending on various domestic and foreign policy options and about particular core values (see Table 4 for summary statistics). These same respondents also answer the common content questions, which cover a range of issues from the Iraq war to voting behavior.

[Table 4 about here]

The dependent variables in this study are questions on economic and military aid taken from

¹⁴That being said, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find support for the strategic motivation at the state level looking only at economic aid allocations.

¹⁵Throughout the paper, I interchange foreign aid and economic aid. This follows from many of the works cited in this paper, which use the same question as dependent variable and freely refer to the preferences as foreign aid preferences rather than economic aid preferences. In the remainder of the paper, I will specify the type of aid as I look at both economic and military aid preferences.




Figure 9: American Preferences for Economic and Military Aid

the CCES survey. The questions ask whether the respondent wants to cut back, keep the same, or expand each program. I define economic and military aid using wording from OECD definitions of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The economic aid definition I use states, “U.S. economic aid is the assistance the U.S. government gives to other countries to reduce poverty and promote economic growth”. The OECD does not include military aid as ODA, but they do define it. Their wording is also incorporated into my definition: “U.S. military aid is the assistance the U.S. government gives to other countries by supplying military equipment and training”. To alleviate worries about a change in preferences due to the time difference between the 1995 WVS and the 2010 CCES, I compare the distribution of the CCES dependent variables to the same variables from a 1990 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) survey. The CCFR study also asks individuals if they want to cut back, keep the same, or expand economic and military aid. Figure 9 shows the distribution of these four variables across the three response categories. All four have a very similar shape. The distribution of military aid preferences in particular has remained remarkably stable over the last twenty years. Finally, because the large majority of respondents want to cut foreign

aid programs, I dichotomize the dependent variable, coding “cut back” as 0 and “keep the same” and “expand” as 1.¹⁶

The key explanatory variables are similar to those used in the cross-national analysis. To test the altruistic hypothesis, I use a variable that assesses an individual’s level of altruism. The question asks whether the respondent agrees or disagrees with the following statement: “People should always be willing to help a stranger, even if it means having to give up something.” I also include measures of charity and domestic welfare preference as robustness checks in some models.¹⁷ The CCES common content includes a question on respondent level of education, which I use as my economic endowment measure.¹⁸ The strategic hypotheses are tested using an individual’s preference for defense spending. This is a five category variable called *Defense* and ranges from “cut back a lot” to “expand a lot”. I try to replicate the same control variables from my cross-national analysis: ideology, political interest, trust in government, immigration, age, gender, and children.

I maintain the same hypotheses from the cross-national analysis, except for the strategic hypothesis. Based on the cross-national results, I now hypothesize that the new strategic variable, *Defense*, will be negatively correlated with preferences for economic aid. *Education* and *Altruism*, on the other hand, should be positively correlated with support for economic aid. *Ideology*, a 7-point scale ranging from “very liberal” to “very conservative” should be negatively correlated with support for economic aid. *PolInterest* and *GovTrust* are both 4-category variables. The political interest variable is constructed from a question asking respondents about their “interest in news and public affairs” asking, “Would you say you follow what’s going on 1-Hardly at all, 2-Only now and then, 3-Some of the time, 4-Most of the time. The trust in government question asks, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? 1-Almost Never, 2-Only some of the time, 3-Most of the time, 4-Just about always”. I expect these

¹⁶ Again, results do not vary substantially if the dependent variable is three categories and the model used is an ordered logit

¹⁷ *Altruism* is a five category variable that ranges from strongly disagree to strongly agree. *Charity* is a five category variable of the same structure as *Altruism*. The statement for *Charity* reads the following: “People have a moral obligation to give money to charitable organizations.” Finally, *Welfare* measures an individual’s attitudes toward spending on domestic poverty relief. Respondents are asked if they would like to cut back or expand the program. This, too, is a five category variable ranging from “cut back a lot” to “expand a lot”.

¹⁸ *Education* is a four category variable corresponding to an individual’s level of education. The categories are 1-complete secondary and below 2-some university 3-university degree 4-postgraduate.

variables to be positively correlated with support for economic aid. Finally, in lieu of a question on nationalism, I use a question on immigration to measure an individual's level of xenophobia. I create a binary indicator if the respondent said Congress and the President should "Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes." The results from the cross-national analysis suggest that this new variable *Immigration* and support for economic aid should be positively correlated. Finally, I expect the demographic control variables, *Age*, *Female*, and *Child*, to be negatively correlated with economic aid.

This data also allows me to test two new hypotheses, H3a and H3b. First, I will investigate whether the strategic hypothesis is upheld when the dependent variable measures preferences for military aid. I expect in the model with military aid as the dependent variable that *Defense* will be positively signed. Second, I test the idea that individuals who believe there is a tradeoff between defense spending and economic aid are driving the negative relationship between the two in the cross-national study. For this analysis, I interact the variable *No Tradeoff* with *Defense*. The tradeoff question asks, "If the U.S. government significantly increased economic aid to other countries, what is your best guess about what would happen to government spending on national defense?". I gave a coding of 1 if a respondent said that defense spending would stay the same or increase, and a coding of 0 if the individual said defense spending would decrease. This question was asked to respondents before the November 2010 election, while the policy and foreign aid questions were asked after. With this setup, I can ensure that the responses to both sets of questions are independent of each other.

H3a: *The more an individual wants to expand spending on national defense, the more the individual should support foreign military aid.*

H3b: *Individuals who want to increase spending on national defense will only support economic aid if they do not see a budgetary tradeoff between the two.*

5.1 US Results

[Table 5 about here]

Table 5 holds results from the logit models used to test the above hypotheses. As explained above, I run the same analysis on both economic aid and military aid, while including an interaction term between *Defense* and *No Tradeoff* in some models of economic aid. The altruistic hypothesis is the most consistently confirmed across models. *Altruism*, *Welfare*, and *Charity* are all positive and significant in most models of economic aid in which they appear. For the substantive effects, moving *Altruism* from its minimum to its maximum in Model 2, while holding *Female* and *Child* at their median and all other variables at their means, produces a significant increase in the predicted probability of economic aid support. Specifically, it produces a .15 increase (from .04-.19). In the model in which military aid is used as the dependent variable, there is no statistically significant effect though a positive relationship can be seen in the full model, Model 2. Figure 10 graphically represents these two trends.




Figure 10: Predicted Probability from US Analysis




Figure 11: Predicted Probability from US Analysis

The economic endowment variable, *Education*, is only significant in one of the models of military aid, Model 1. Though not significant, it is negative in all of the full specifications. This is somewhat surprising considering the results from the cross-national study and other research both on foreign aid and various types of international economic engagement, which show economic endowment to be positively and significantly correlated with support for international economic policies. Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between *Education* and economic and military aid, holding other variables at the above mentioned levels. Ultimately, these results go against that predicted in H2.

Defense on the other hand is highly significant and positive in the models in which military aid is the dependent variable. This confirms the strategic sub-hypothesis, H3a, that individuals will see military aid as serving a strategic purpose and thus, security-minded individuals will support it. Moving *Defense* from its minimum to its maximum while holding all variables as noted above induces a .23 change in the probability that an individual will want to keep or expand military aid (.07-.30). This change is significant at the .05 level and is depicted in Figure 12.

In the models in which economic aid is the dependent variable, *Defense* is positive, but in-




Figure 12: Predicted Probability from US Analysis

significant in the three full model specifications, Models 2, 3, and 4. However, the results in Model 5 are suggestive of the predicted tradeoff relationship, though not significant at traditional levels. The coefficient on *Defense* is negative in Model 5 and the coefficient on the interaction term is positive. The marginal effects presented below in Figure 13 provide support for H3b. When individuals believe there is a tradeoff between defense spending and foreign economic aid, the marginal effect of moving *Defense* from its minimum to its maximum is a .05 decrease in the probability of supporting foreign economic aid. However, when individuals do not see a tradeoff, the marginal effect is a positive change of almost .20 in the probability of supporting economic aid. The upper and lower bounds on the marginal effects are quite wide, but the overall picture is still persuasive. A more thorough discussion of all these findings follows this section.

There are additional variables of interest in these results such as *Ideology*, *GovTrust* and *Immigration*. They are the only other variables to attain a high level of significance in at least two of the models. *Ideology* is negative and significant, at least at the .1 level, in Models 2, 4, and 5 of economic aid and, it is positive, but not significant at conventional levels in Model 2 of military aid.




Figure 13: Marginal Effect of Defense on Foreign Aid Support as No Tradeoff Perception Changes

The only model of economic aid in which it does not attain conventional significance is Model 3. This is the model that also includes *Welfare*. *Ideology* loses its significance and much of its power in Model 3 due to the high collinearity between the two variables. Nonetheless, these results conform to predictions and they confirm the results of the cross-national study.

The most consistent predictor of support for both types of foreign aid is *GovTrust*. It is always positively related to foreign aid preferences, and produces large, statistically significant increases in support for foreign aid. Using Model 2 of economic aid, I move *GovTrust* from its minimum to its maximum keeping all other variables at previously noted values. This produces an increase of .46, from .04-.50, in the probability that an individual will support economic aid. While not as large, the effect on military aid preferences is still substantial at .29, a change from .10 at the *GovTrust* minimum to .39 at its maximum. Both these effects can be seen in Figure 14. These results suggest that trust in government plays a large role in determining attitudes towards foreign aid, confirming the results of Chong and Gradstein (2008).

Immigration also is a highly significant and positive predictor of foreign economic aid support




Figure 14: Predicted Probability from US Analysis

in every model of economic aid in which it appears. While it is positive in Model 2 of military aid, it does not obtain conventional levels of significance. The increases in probability are not large compared to the variables above, though *Immigration* is only a binary indicator. Using Model 2 of economic aid, the probability that an individual supports foreign economic aid increases by .12 if she wants Congress and the President to give legal status to illegal immigrants.

5.2 Discussion

Does the American data help further our understanding of whether individuals support foreign aid for the same reasons states give it? There are two clear findings from the CCES survey. First, I find a robust relationship between altruism and foreign economic aid. Across all models with economic aid as the dependent variable, *Altruism* is highly significant and produces large substantive effects. Like in the cross-national case, the finding on *Welfare* is also somewhat counterintuitive as it is possible that individuals supporting domestic welfare would prefer their governments to spend the money that would go toward economic aid at home. Instead, my results suggest that individuals are

externalizing their domestic norms of altruism as Lumsdaine (1993) proposes. Second, it appears that Americans do not support foreign economic aid out of economic self-interest. Although *Class* and *Education* are strong predictors in the cross-national analysis, *Education* is not a significant predictor in the American CCES data. Again, the economic self-interest hypothesis relies on the fact that the researcher is properly identifying those segments of the population that would both benefit economically from foreign aid and understand this relationship. There are then two possible explanations for this null result, either *Education* is not a good measure of economic endowment or the economically endowed do not support foreign aid because they believe they benefit from it. As I have used the most prominent variable for economic endowment in the literature, I am inclined to believe the latter.

The main reason for investigating American public opinion is to pursue two hypotheses to explain the negative relationship between defense priority and foreign economic aid I find in the cross-national results. First, I proposed that while security-minded individuals have negative opinions on economic aid, they might have positive attitudes toward military aid. Indeed, *Defense* is highly positively correlated with preferences for military aid confirming sub-hypothesis H3a. Second, while the opportunity cost story does not seem to influence supporters of domestic charities or welfare, I suggested that it might sway individuals that would like to increase or keep defense spending the same. Thus, I interacted *Defense* and *No Tradeoff*. There is some evidence that opportunity cost concerns impact the relationship between defense spending attitudes and those on foreign economic aid. Because these results are only suggestive and the hypothesis is uniquely tested on a sample of Americans, I hesitate to make conclusions on the possible influences of opportunity cost considerations in other countries. Thus, I can neither accept nor reject hypothesis H3b and suggest the need for further exploration of the negative relationship between economic aid and security across countries.

6 Conclusion

To investigate whether state-level determinants of foreign aid are predictors of support for foreign aid at the individual level, I have assessed both cross-national and American preferences on economic and military aid. Across countries, the altruistic and economic self-interest hypotheses were confirmed, but I found the reverse relationship predicted by the strategic hypothesis between security preferences and foreign economic aid. In the American public opinion data, I once again found support for the altruistic hypothesis, but evidence for the economic self-interest theory was much weaker. In confirmation of the strategic sub-hypotheses, support for defense spending was positively correlated with military aid. Moreover, the relationship between security and economic aid was influenced by the perception of a budgetary tradeoff between the two. Overall, both the cross-national and American study provide much support for the link between norms of altruism and their influence on foreign policy, however two puzzles remain regarding the relationship between economic self-interest and security, and foreign aid.

Clearly these results motivate a more thorough exploration of cross-national data and American public opinion on foreign aid. I am considering three main avenues of research, which may provide a better understanding. First, experimental survey work can help to identify more precisely the mechanisms by which individuals support foreign aid. Similar to the analysis already conducted by Tingley (2009), a survey experiment that randomly varies the effects of foreign aid on the individual or country, or one in which the characteristics of the potential recipient are varied, could shed light on what motivates individual support. Second, attitudes toward foreign aid may be influenced by country-level factors that would not be picked up in my analysis. Thus, future work could develop hierarchical models in which characteristics of donor countries, such as amounts of aid given, would be included in an analysis. Finally, it is likely that attitudes about foreign aid vary over time and between elites and the public. Furthermore, these changes can affect the foreign aid policy decisions of the government (Milner 2006). Thus, future analysis can also uncover how preferences on these issues move through time together and how they relate to donor policy.

7 Appendix

7.1 Tables

TABLE 1: Summary statistics of variables in pooled sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
EconAid	11873	0.18	0.39	0	1
Welfare	11286	2.5	0.67	1	3
Charity	12004	1.36	0.68	1	3
Class	11263	2.82	0.91	1	5
Education	11009	2.04	1.11	1	4
Natl Security	11252	1.25	0.55	1	3
Ideology	10382	5.38	1.9	1	10
Soc-Ideology	11223	0	1	-1.73	1.76
Econ-Ideology	11227	0	1	-3.6	1.86
PolInterest	12133	2.57	0.92	1	4
GovTrust	11843	2.16	0.75	1	4
Nationalism	11463	3.36	0.8	1	4
NeighImm	11151	0.07	0.26	0	1
Female	12196	0.52	0.5	0	1
Age	12155	2.14	0.76	1	3
Child	12134	0.71	0.45	0	1

TABLE 2: Individual correlates of support for foreign economic aid*, Cross-National

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Charity	0.22*** (0.034)	0.25*** (0.049)	0.11 (0.096)	0.25*** (0.052)		0.21*** (0.043)	0.21*** (0.044)
Welfare					0.27*** (0.076)		
Class	0.20*** (0.035)	0.19*** (0.047)	0.14* (0.069)	0.14*** (0.041)	0.21*** (0.054)		0.20*** (0.041)
Education						0.29*** (0.027)	
Natl Security	-0.43*** (0.081)	-0.34*** (0.088)	-0.51*** (0.146)	-0.34*** (0.081)	-0.34*** (0.090)	-0.38*** (0.082)	-0.37*** (0.079)
Ideology		-0.14*** (0.015)	-0.17*** (0.014)		-0.12*** (0.012)	-0.13*** (0.014)	-0.13*** (0.018)
Soc-ideology				-0.13* (0.054)			
Econ-ideology				-0.09 (0.056)			
PolInterest		0.29*** (0.060)	0.14 (0.098)	0.29*** (0.059)	0.32*** (0.062)	0.27*** (0.077)	0.30*** (0.066)
GovTrust		0.19** (0.063)	0.26** (0.099)	0.20** (0.066)	0.22** (0.073)	0.21*** (0.062)	0.18*** (0.053)
Nationalism		-0.12 (0.075)	-0.07 (0.102)	-0.12 (0.086)	-0.11 (0.077)	-0.09 (0.082)	
NeighImm							-0.80*** (0.220)
Female		0.05 (0.087)	0.02 (0.088)	0.02 (0.098)	0.09 (0.084)	0.11 (0.082)	0.08 (0.068)
Age		-0.23** (0.076)	-0.18* (0.073)	-0.21** (0.078)	-0.20** (0.073)	-0.17* (0.078)	-0.20** (0.071)
Child		-0.06 (0.078)	-0.12* (0.061)	0.00 (0.092)	-0.05 (0.072)	-0.01 (0.081)	-0.07 (0.085)
Constant	-0.96*** (0.138)	-0.67* (0.285)	-0.76 (0.601)	-1.41*** (0.327)	-1.48*** (0.326)	-0.90*** (0.270)	-1.10*** (0.202)
Observations	10,149	8,283	8,283	8,418	7,990	8,119	8,124
Country FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R2	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.10
Log likelihood	-3397.40	-2703.35	-2881.27	-2736.99	-2611.34	-2618.24	-2643.06

*Coefficient estimates from logit models with survey weights, binary indicators for country and robust standard errors clustered by country (in parentheses).

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

TABLE 3: Individual correlates of support for foreign economic aid*, Within Country

	Australia	Finland	Germany	Japan	New Zealand	Norway	Spain	Sweden	USA
Charity	0.16 (0.085)	0.17 (0.201)	0.31** (0.116)	0.64 (0.335)	0.50** (0.181)	0.19 (0.125)	0.04 (0.151)	0.36* (0.152)	0.28* (0.131)
Class	0.19* (0.085)	0.32* (0.127)	0.15 (0.096)	0.20 (0.192)	0.12 (0.207)	0.33*** (0.098)	0.01 (0.097)	0.24* (0.103)	0.24 (0.143)
Natl Security	-0.69*** (0.172)	-0.32 (0.208)	-0.07 (0.222)	-0.02 (0.298)	0.07 (0.413)	-0.22 (0.165)	-0.32 (0.204)	-0.84** (0.303)	-0.41* (0.205)
Ideology	-0.13** (0.042)	-0.22** (0.071)	-0.13** (0.051)	-0.06 (0.093)	-0.20* (0.094)	-0.17*** (0.050)	-0.09* (0.043)	-0.11** (0.041)	-0.17* (0.071)
PolInterest	0.32*** (0.084)	0.46*** (0.130)	0.27* (0.116)	0.31 (0.206)	0.41 (0.222)	0.45*** (0.130)	0.14 (0.081)	0.26* (0.105)	0.42* (0.168)
GovTrust	0.15 (0.097)	0.04 (0.164)	0.25* (0.116)	-0.12 (0.219)	0.76** (0.236)	0.14 (0.138)	0.03 (0.103)	0.45*** (0.129)	0.23 (0.161)
Nationalism	-0.23 (0.127)	0.18 (0.158)	-0.32*** (0.095)	-0.28 (0.187)	0.01 (0.295)	-0.19 (0.115)	0.08 (0.112)	-0.15 (0.132)	-0.60** (0.230)
Female	-0.04 (0.140)	0.57* (0.223)	-0.26 (0.152)	-0.07 (0.289)	-0.20 (0.321)	0.27 (0.167)	0.07 (0.155)	0.09 (0.167)	-0.86*** (0.255)
Age	-0.24* (0.110)	-0.22 (0.157)	-0.32** (0.112)	-0.37 (0.285)	-0.39 (0.266)	-0.05 (0.128)	-0.03 (0.118)	-0.36** (0.128)	-0.02 (0.200)
Child	-0.05 (0.168)	-0.33 (0.241)	-0.06 (0.167)	-0.29 (0.384)	0.11 (0.434)	-0.43* (0.204)	-0.05 (0.192)	-0.15 (0.200)	0.45 (0.316)
Constant	-0.65 (0.641)	-2.57** (0.820)	-1.42* (0.613)	-1.93* (0.943)	-4.28** (1.461)	-2.04** (0.712)	-0.46 (0.605)	-0.71 (0.741)	-1.75 (1.191)
Observations	1,554	719	1,330	591	481	942	755	727	1,184
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.08	0.10
Log likelihood	-685.48	-296.68	-573.26	-183.39	-143.86	-460.07	-483.89	-433.46	-273.66

*Coefficient estimates from logit models, robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

TABLE 4: Summary statistics of variables in US sample

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
EconAid	817	0.27	0.44	0	1
MilAid	823	0.24	0.40	0	1
Altruism	998	3.72	0.92	1	5
Welfare	822	3.07	1.23	1	5
Charity	998	2.92	1.23	1	5
Education	1000	1.99	0.94	1	4
Defense	813	2.68	1.10	1	5
No Tradeoff	997	0.62	0.49	0	1
Ideology	965	4.24	1.88	1	7
PolInterest	988	3.17	0.83	1	4
GovTrust	998	1.78	0.72	1	4
Immigration	1000	0.38	0.49	0	1
Age	1000	47.80	14.67	18	89
Female	1000	0.50	0.50	0	1
Child	999	0.27	0.42	0	1

TABLE 5: Individual correlates of support for foreign economic aid*, US Sample 2010

	Economic Aid					Military Aid	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 1	Model 2
Altruism	0.10 (0.197)	0.43* (0.193)			0.45* (0.192)	-0.05 (0.183)	0.21 (0.178)
Welfare			0.37* (0.147)				
Charity				0.20 (0.129)			
Education	0.05 (0.128)	-0.06 (0.166)	-0.10 (0.179)	-0.10 (0.175)	-0.08 (0.168)	-0.27* (0.138)	-0.30 (0.162)
Defense	-0.06 (0.112)	0.11 (0.140)	0.05 (0.139)	0.08 (0.132)	-0.13 (0.219)	0.41** (0.128)	0.42** (0.161)
No Tradeoff					-0.76 (0.671)		
Def*No T-off					0.40 (0.246)		
Ideology		-0.19* (0.090)	-0.09 (0.102)	-0.17 (0.088)	-0.18* (0.091)		0.20 (0.108)
PolInterest		-0.03 (0.192)	0.02 (0.194)	-0.05 (0.203)	-0.03 (0.184)		0.18 (0.190)
GovTrust		0.87*** (0.242)	0.81*** (0.243)	0.84*** (0.241)	0.88*** (0.240)		0.60* (0.258)
Immigration		1.09*** (0.321)	1.05** (0.341)	1.22*** (0.334)	1.10*** (0.318)		0.39 (0.345)
Age		-0.01 (0.011)	-0.01 (0.011)	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.01 (0.010)		-0.01 (0.012)
Female		-0.25 (0.310)	-0.23 (0.317)	-0.19 (0.310)	-0.27 (0.308)		-0.16 (0.297)
Child		-0.57 (0.331)	-0.52 (0.361)	-0.46 (0.359)	-0.60 (0.325)		-0.29 (0.364)
Constant	-1.17 (0.862)	-3.29* (1.390)	-3.19* (1.256)	-2.28 (1.223)	-3.02* (1.422)	-1.62 (0.910)	-4.95*** (1.140)
Observations	806	772	772	771	769	810	775
Pseudo R2	0.00	0.17	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.05	0.08
Log likelihood	-473.80	-344.91	-344.26	-348.45	-342.00	-421.63	-341.42

*Coefficient estimates from logit models with survey weights, robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

7.2 Principal Components Analysis

All questions use a ten-point scale with 1 identifying positions on the left and 10 identifying positions on the right. Both *Econ-Ideology* and *Soc-Ideology* are variables predicted based on the first component in each analysis. They are normalized using the pooled mean and standard deviation.

Three questions were used for *Econ-Ideology*. The first, *Competition*, is a variable based on a question asking individuals where on a 10-point scale they fit, with 1 being “Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people” to 10 “Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas”. The second, *Private*, uses a question asking respondents to put themselves on a 10-point scale, with 1 being “Government ownership of business should increase” to 10 “Private ownership of business should increase”. Finally, *Work* is a 10-point scale, with 1 being “Hard work doesn’t generally bring success - it’s more a matter of luck and connections” to 10 “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”.

Three questions were used to construct the variable *Soc-Ideology*. All three ask an individual to place on a 10-point scale their views on abortion, homosexuality, and divorce, with 1 being “always justifiable” to 10 “never justifiable”.

Below are the results from a principal components analysis of these questions. The factor loadings from the first component of each were used to create the variables.

Econ-Ideology Principal Components/Correlation				
Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	1.56616	0.78527	0.5221	0.5221
Comp2	0.780892	0.127945	0.2603	0.7824
Comp3	0.652946	.	0.2176	1

Econ-Ideology Eigenvectors				
Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Unexplained
Competition	0.6164	-0.0249	-0.787	0
Private	0.56	-0.6889	0.4603	0
Work	0.5536	0.7244	0.4107	0

Soc-Ideology Principal Components/Correlation				
Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	2.13014	1.61274	0.71	0.71
Comp2	0.517398	0.164932	0.1725	0.8825
Comp3	0.352467	.	0.1175	1

Soc-Ideology Eigenvectors				
Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Unexplained
Abortion	0.59	-0.417	0.6914	0
Homosexuality	0.5472	0.8362	0.0374	0
Divorce	0.5937	-0.3563	-0.7215	0

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